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On the 6th January 1914, at a mass meeting in Pretoria Town Hall, the Amalgamated 
Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASI~RS) decided to call a strike of white 
railway workers to begin on the 8th January. (1) On the same day the Minister of 
Defence, J. C. Smuts warned a m r ~ y  generals to prepare for Martial law, which would 
be declared soon. (25 The next day troops occupied the stations and railway 
workshops of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Germiston. That day H. J. Poutsma, the 
general secretary of the ASRHS, addressed a mass meeting of white railway workers 
at Braamfontein, who unanimously decided to strike. (3) Within three days the 
citizen forces and permanent defence force units were mobilized. (4) On the 10th 
January Poutsma and Nield, both officials of the ASRHS, and Colin Wade of the Labour 
Party were 'arrested under the Preservation of Peace Ordinance of 1902, which permitted 
the authorities to arrest and hold incommunicado those suspected of sedition. (5) 
The South African Industrial Federation (SAIF), to which most trade unions 
on the Rand were affiliated, had an agreement with the ASRHS to consult one another 
and provide support in the event of a strike. The SAIF executive met on the 11th 
January to determine what action to take. They decided to ballot the membership to 
ascertain their views and decided to recommend a sympathy strike. (6) Only a few 
thousand participated in the ballot but, of these, a large proportion favoured a 
strike. (7) On the 11th January the Typographical Union and the Bakers Union 
declared a strike. (8) Trade union and Labour Party leaders addressed meetings 
throughout the country, at which they called for support for the railway strike and 
urged the workers to avoid violent confrontation with the authorities. (9) At a mass 
meeting of about 15,000 people in Market Square, Johannesburg, the trade unionists 
accused the government of trying to provoke a general strike by arresting the 
leaders. (10) After the meeting a large crowd escorted two of the leaders, J. T. Bain 
and Geo Mason, back to the Trades Hall to prevent them being arrested. (11) On the 
12th Jmua,ry some sections of white railway workers in the Cape and Duban struck 
work and those in East London and Queenstown decided to strike unless Poutsma were 
released. (12) By the 13th January all sections of white railwag workers in 
Bloemfontein had joined the strike. On that date the white workers at Witbank 
collieries went on strike and the Transvaal Miners Association, the white gold-mine 
workers' trade union, declared that their ballot favoured a strike. (13) In these 
circumstances the SAIF felt that they could command sufficient support and called a 
general strike of affiliated unions, to begin on the 14th January. (14) 
By the 14th January all railway lines, bridges, docks, telephone and 
telegraph installations, power stations and gold and coal mines were defended by 
armed troops. Smuts later described this as the largest scale mobilization ever to 
take place in South Africa. For example: 1,798 armed troops and police guarded the 
railway workshops and docks in Cape Town; 240 armed men guarded the railway station, 
bridge and power station at Vereeniging; 50 armed men guarded each mine at Witbank, 
etc. (15) 
Martial law was proclaimed at midnight on the 13th January. 
Martial Law 
The conditions existing under Martial Law made the pursuit of normal strike 
strategies impossible and rendered any other form of protest extremely difficult. 
Plartial law regulations forbad picketing , any attempt to induce workers to 
strike, any interference,direct or indirect, with employees or relatives of employees 
of the railways, power stations, etc. It was forbidden to use insulting language, 
threats, or Qobjectionable epithets3. It was illegal to be on railway premises or 
lines unless one was working there or had obtained a permit. (16) Under the 
regulations a curfew was imposed, public meetings were prohibited and communications 
and newspapers were censored. The authorities isolated the two main strike centres 
with a regulation that made it necessary to obtain a permit in order to travel 
between Johannesburg and Pretoria. (17) 
The government mobilized enough force to ensure that the regulations were 
complied with. Apart from the commandos and the permanent force, hundreds of 
"reliable" citizens were enrolled as Special Constables and armed to replace police 
called up for strike duty. (18) Commnding officers were instructed to use all the 
force necessary to ensure that the regulations were not contravened: 
Exercise greatest possible severity keeping all 
strikers off railway and running premises. Don't 
hesitate to shoot if they attempt enter without 
warning or on apparently malicious intent. The 
names of persons attempting to interfere with 
running staff to be taken and reported here. (19) 
Following the declaration of martial law, the authorities engaged in 
wholesale arrests of strike leaders. On the 15th January the Pretoria and 
Johannesburg strike committees and %undreds" of strikers in Benoni were arrested. 
The next C@ more strikers and Labour Party leaders were arrested. On the 17th 
January strike leaders in Volksrust and Bloemfontein and sixty-two people meeting in 
the Labour Party offices in Johannesburg were arrested. The Johannesburg strike 
committee had been arrested while they were in the Trades Hall deliberating on the 
strike and awaiting the outcome of a request to tlie government to open negotiations. 
Woops surrounded the building and a field gun was trained on it. The officer in 
charge had been instructed to arrest everyone in the Trades Hal1,"using most drastic 
measures to do so if, after warning, the persons in that building refuse to give 
themselves up without violence". (20) 
The Extent of the Strike 
There are many reasons for supposing that the white railway workers, more 
than other groups of white workers, would be reluctant to strike. 
The ASRHS had made no concrete preparations for a strike. (21) The 
leadership did not consult the branches of the ASRHS, other unions who had members 
on the railways, or the SAIF, before calling the strike. (22) They had made no 
plans for organizing the strike or for supporting the strikers. (23) Under these 
circumstances the extent to which the railwaymen supported the strike indicates 
their loyalty to the union and their sense of grievance. 
White railway workers were governed by the Railways and Harbours Service 
Act of 1912. This prohibited strikes with penalties of up to £50 a;nd/or six months 
with or without hard labour. More importantly the strikers risked forfeiting their 
pension rights, lost all their contributions to the sick fund and holiday rights. 
Railway workers who lived in houses owned by the Administration risked ejection from 
their homes. The rai1wa;y workers were well aware that the Administration operated a 
black list which included the names of all those who had been active in previous 
strikes, and trade union organizers. During the 1914 strike the martial law 
authorities had specific instructions to draw up a black list of all those who were 
active during the strike. (24) 
It seems that the strike was most fully supported by railway work-shop 
employees. The majority of these workers in Pretoria, Salt River (cape), Johannesburg, 
Bloemfontein and Durban, struck work. (25) These were the more skilled workers. A 
large proportion of them belonged either to craft unions (e.g. the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers, Boilermakers Society, etc.) or to the railway workers general union, the 
ASRHS. (26) The strike was supported in some areas by other sections of railwag 
workers. The running staff in Bloemfontein, Pretoria and other, smaller, more 
isolated areas also struck work. (27) Some other groups of white workers struck in 
sympathy, usually those belonging to trade unions which also had members working on 
the railways. The white building workers in Pretoria struck work on the 11th January, 
the white workers in the municipal workshops of Pretoria struck work on the 19th 
January, the white typographical workers struck work in Johannesburg on the 14th 
January, and, on the same day, the white workers in the Witbank collieries struck 
work. (28) White workers on the gold mines struck work in sympathy from the 14th 
January. The nines were heavily defended by troops to prevent picketing or sabotage. 
Altogether 9,059 workers struck work on 54 gold mines with a loss of 43,957 shifts 
(compare this with the figures for the 1913 strike, which were 19,000, 55, and 
69,665, respectively). (29) However, the gold mines remained in operation owing to 
a reorganization of work and changes in the deployment of the black and white labour 
available. ( 30) Generally there was comparatively little dislocation to the railway 
service because most of the running staff remained at work. By this date the majority 
of strikers had returned to work except in the workshops of Pretoria, Durban and 
Johannesburg, where a large number still remained out. The Durban workers, who were 
the last to return, decided to return en masse and not singly, on the 26th January.(32) 
That day the Government deported nine of the strike leaders to &gland. 
The general strike of 1914 never really got off the ground. The unions 
involved had not done the preparation and organization necessary for a successful 
strike. The government, by contrast, was well prepared. It would have been a 
difficult strike to organize in any circumstances, but, with the leadership imprisoned, 
communication between the various centres impossible, picketing and mass meetings 
forbidden, it proved to be a total defeat. By the end of the strike nearly seven 
hundred white workers had been retrenched, hundreds of strikers, including all the 
leaders, were blacklisted and several hundred workers had to accept lower rates of 
p w  when they returned to work. (33) 
ThG, Issues - the Railway Workers 
The issue over which the strike had been called was the decision in 
October 1913 of the Railway Administration to retrench labour, mainly in the railway 
workshops. (34) For months before the strike the ASRHS tried to get the decision 
changed. They sent deputations to the Minister of Railways, Burton, asking for the 
decision to be re-examined and they informed him that their members would be willing 
to lose one hour per day rather than any workers losing their jobs. (35) The ASmS 
head office was in contact with all the branches and obtained details of the 
retrenchments. They claimed that the Administration had lied when it guaranteed that 
only new workers would be retrenched. The ASRHS discovered that many experienced 
workers were to lose their jobs and the union executive saw this as an indirect 
attack on wages. (36) The ASRHS was unsuccess£ul in its attempts to discuss the 
retrenchments with the minister and petitioned the Governor General to whom they 
complained about the contemptuous way in which the minister had treated them. (37) 
The railway workers were particularly aggrieved because the Administration 
had begun carrying out retrenchments at a time when a government commission was still 
heariq evidence about the grievances of white railway workers. This commission was 
set up as part of the l1trucel1 agreement in the 1913 strike. It was one of a series of 
comissions which had investigated the grievances of white railway workers. The 1914 
commission was investigating trade union demands for: a) 8 hour day; b) a minimum 
wage for white adult employees of eiglht shillings per day; c) revision of local 
allowance; d) abolition of llpiecework"; f) extra pay for overtime; g) less severe 
punishments ; h) decentralization of shop maaagement . 
Many of these demands had been investigated by previous commissions. But 
their recommendations had largely been ignored by the management. (38) The comissions 
noted the extreme antipathy of the management to trade unionism and the fear of the 
employees that they would be victimized for giving evidence. (39) All the commissions 
had recommended a big reduction of hours wherever possible. This recommendation had 
also been ignored. The 1914 commission noted that the running staff worked an average 
of seventy-three hours per week. (40) 
The Issues for Other White Workers 
The 1913 strike had begun on a single gold mine over a specific issue. Six 
weeks later, after most of the white gold miners had joined the strike, the SAIF called 
a general strike and many other groups of white workers joined the strike, including 
building, engineering, tramway, power station and typographical workers. (41) On the 
4th July, after police and troops tried to break up a mass meeting of strikers in 
Johannesburg, rioting broke out. The rioters burned down the offices of the Star 
newspaper and Park Station but were prevented by troops from attacking the Corner 
House. In all, twenty-one people were shot dead by troops. In order to regain control 
of the town Smuts and the Prime Minister, Botha, arranged to meet the strike Leaders 
and agree on a compromise. As part of the agreement all the trade unions submitted 
demands via the S- to the government. These included demands for laws restricting 
the hours of work, establishing minimum wages and paid holidays, a3ld a law laying down 
the conditions of work in factories. (42) 
The white mine workers submitted their demands separately. They demanded 
increased wages, decreased hours, paid holiday, the abolition of the system of 
importing black labour and the recognition of trade unions. The most important factor 
behind the gold workersfstrike in 1913 was the insecurity of the white workersf 
position. For some years the position of the skilled white worker had been steadily 
undevlnined by deskilling, the increasing employment of black labour in all the 
production processes and the conversion of the white miner into a supervisor. (43) 
The white miners unionized in an attempt to defend their position. Manag'ements refused 
to recognize or negotiate with the Transvaal Miners Association, which, they felt, 
would encroach on their right to control and deploy labour in the most profitable W& 
This was also the policy of the Chamber of Mines. (44) The question of the recognition 
of trade unions was one of the more important issues of the 1913 strike. 
The trade union leaders called off the strike in 1913 after receiving 
assurances from the ministers that the white workers' grievances would be investigated. 
They obtained no specific commitments. The government did not introduce the 
legislation which the trade unions had demanded. The Chamber of Mines agreed to 
recognize trade unions but only under certain conditions, which would have severely 
restricted their role. After the strike Lionel Phillips, a leading figure in the 
gold mining industry, commented: 
The men will very soon realize that they have got 
nothing out of all this worth having, and that a great 
many of them have lost their jobs, which is not, I 
imagine, the wa;y for the labour leaders to find favour 
in their eyes. So now we may have a considerable period 
of quiet. (45) 
The white workers did not, however, desert the trade unions. On the contrary, trade 
union membership increased at an unprecedented rate. (46) The support of other groups 
of white workers for the railww strike in 1914 is an indication of the extent to 
which grievances, which had led to the strike in 1913, still existed. 
The State l 
How was it that the state's forces were able to act so quickly and so 
effectively to crush the 1914 strike? Why did the SAP Party ministers responsible 
deem it necessary to act so harshly and uncompromisingly? 
In the months following the 1913 strike, and particularly towards the end 
of the year, when it became apparent that the strike had been no victory for the white 
workers, there were continual rumours of strikes and several trade union leaders made 
very militant speeches to their members. (47) Smuts was probably loath to repeat 
his experiences of 1913, when he had been forced to ask for the support of imperial 
troops to regain control of the Rand and had to sign an agreement with the trade union 
leaders about which he later commented: l l 
I 
I admit freely that it was one of the hardest things 
I have done in m;y life to put q y  name on a document 1 
together with that of M r  Bain and the others. (48) 4 l 
The government may have been especially alarmed by the threat of a strike on the , 
railways because of their strategic importance in the economy and defence of the Union. 
, 
In 1913 the government had been unprepazed for the spread of the strike and 
the escalation of violence. The only local forces available were unreliable because 
of their sympathy with the strikers. (49) The defence force of the Union was in the 
midst of reorganization in line with the 1912 Defence Act. Imperial troops were being 
withdrawn, old volunteer organizations were being demobilized and new citizen force 
and permanent force units were being organized and trained. (50) The imperial 
government permitted the Union Government to use imperial troops presumably became of 
the inrportame of the gold mines to their own interests. But the Union Government was 
wasned that these troops were not stationed in South Africa for this purpose. (51) It 
was becoming clearer that war was likely to break out in Europe soon and if this 
occurred the last of the imperial troops would be withdrawn. (52) 
After the 1913 strike, Smuts, as Minister of Defence, and the new leaders l 
of the Union Defence Force, drew up a scheme for maintaining control in the event of 
riots or rebellion. (53) The 1914 strike provided an opportunity to test the scheme 
and to demonstrate the power of the state to all sections of society (A second 
opportunity was to follow: the nationalist rebellion of 1914.) i 
After the 1914 strike had been suppressed,the control officers drew up 
detailed reports of the strike. These concentrated almost entirely on military matters 
and commented only briefly on the str ike i t se l f .  The control officer for the Cape 
District reported: 
The successful employment of the Defence Force on 
str ike duty has not only put their  organization to 
a practical t e s t  but has also demonstrated to the 
public i n  a forceable manner thei r  real  u t i l i t y  for  
w a r  purposes and whatever the cost has been it has 
been amply repaid by the general feeling of security 
i n  the community thereby engendered. (54) 
In his  speech i n  Parliament i n  support of a b i l l  to  indemnify the government 
for actions taken during the strike, Smuts justified the measures taken by claiming that 
the str ike was  a ffsyndicalist conspiracyf1 which aimed a t  the overthrow of elected 
authority by means of a general strike. (55) During the str ike the police removed a l l  
the records from the offices of the trade unions and the SAIF with the intention of 
gathering evidence of th is  flconspiracyfl. They found none. In  support of h is  
contention Smuts cited twenty-nine cases of attempted dynauiting and sabotage of the 
railways. (56) In  i t se l f ,  th is  i s  not proof of a conspiracy. There was no evidence 
that  the people Smuts called f ' d ~ r o u s  yndicalistsl1 played any role i n  the 
a;vnamiting. 
It would be very diff icult  to ascertain whether or  not Smuts believed i n  his  
talk of a syndicalist conspiracy. It seems most unlikely that there was such a 
conspiracy. The police fai led to find any evidence i n  1914 and no one since then has 
had my more success. 
In 1913 the SAIF had acted as the organizing body through which all  the 
aff i l ia ted unions submitted thei r  demands. After the str ike,  when the SAIF declared 
a l1suspendedW strike, they did so as a body with considerable authority i n  the trade 
union movement. (57) After the 1913 str ike the goverrnjlent and the Chamber of Mines 
agreed to recognize trade unions, under certain conditions. But they refused to 
recognize the SAIF, which was seen as an ffextremistfl organization. (58) Despite thei r  
agreement to co-operate with the SAIF and to consult with them before declaring a 
strike, the ASRHS leadership called a str ike unilaterally. When the s t r ike  broke out 
the SAIF was unprepared for  it. The government was f a r  better  prepared. This led 
trade unionists a t  the time and since to cast doubt on the integrity of Poutsma, the 
general secretary of the ASRHS, who called the strike. In  May 1914 a Labour MLA 
suggested that the kernel of truth i n  the conspiracy theory was, i n  fact,  a degree of 
connivance between Poutsma and the manager of the railwws, Hoy, and Smuts. (59) 
Poutsma i s  certainly an enigmatic figure. He was one of the deportees i n  1914, 
returned to South Africa in 1915 and became an organizer i n  Smutsts party, the South 
African Party. 
The government intended to  "drive a wedgef1 between the extremists i n  the 
labour movement and the moderates. (60) This was one reason for the -deportation of 
the labour leaders. Like the present South African government, the government then 
seemed determined that, i f  it was to deal with trade unions, it would choose with what 
sort  of unions it would be dealing. A t  the end of 1913 the gover~lment had introduced 
legislation with which it  hoped to control the white labour movement. The government's 
actions i n  1914 were intended to create the right climate for  the passage of these 
bi l l s .  
In i t s  actions against white workers i n  1914 the government demonstrated 
that  it would severely repress any actions it deemed to be threatening. A fear that 
was often expressed was that any unrest amongst the white population would have an 
adverse effect on the abi l i ty  of the s ta te  and employers to control black workers. (61) 
These fears were expressed by Smuts i n  Parliament: 
This i s  not a country W here we can allow a s ta te  of 
anarchy to  prevail. We are a small colony i n  a dark 
continent. Whatever divisions creep i n  among the 
whites are suxe to be reflected in the conduct of the 
native population, and if ever there was a country 
where the white population must be ever watchful and 
careful and highly organized and ready to put down 
with an iron hand all attempts such as were made on 
the present occasion, that country is South Africa. 
The government felt that and has acted accordingly. (62) 
Legislation 
The 1913 strike had demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing legislation, 
the 1909 Industrial Disputes Act of the Transvaal, in controlling strikes. (63) 
In 1913 trade unions were unrecognized in legislation,, and at the end of the year a bill 
Itto provide for the registration and regulation of trade unionsll was introduced. (64) l 
The bill laid down conditions which trade unions had to comply with in order to l 
I 
register ,and required them to provide information of their funds, allocation of funds, I 
membership, etc. The bill also prescribed penalties for any attempt to intimidate 
people to join a union and made trade union officials liable for the illegal acts of l 
the union. 1 I 
I 
At the sane time the Industrial Disputes Prevention Bill was introduced. 
The intention of the bill was to prevent sympathy strikes and make legal general 
strikes impossible as well as to provide means for the solution of disputes before 
any strike occurred. (65) It forbad picketing, provided for compulsory ballots before 
and during a strike, and made strikes for llessentialll service workers illegal. It 
also made it illegal to strike where this action might endanger life or expose 
valuable property to injury. 
At the end of 1913 the Public Meetings and Disturbances Bill was introduced. 
This was redrafted after the 1914 strike as the Peace Preservation Bill. If the 
government had reason to fear serious disorders they would be able by proclamation to 
enforce the provisions of this bill, which would allow the authorities power to arrest 
without warrant, to search houses without warrant, to banish offenders, to conmandeer 
goods and to set up special tribunals instead of juries to try cases of infringement. 
The bill was condemned from all quarters. Smuts was warned by a SA Party official 
to water down the provisions of the bill. (66) 
Following the 1914 strike there were numerous indications of the extent to 
which the government had alienated the white workers and other sections of the public, 
both by its actions during the strike and the legislation which it pursued afterwards. 
In the Transvaal Provincial Council elections of the 18th March there was a swing to 
the Labour Party and twenty-three out of the twenty-five candidates which they had put 
up were elected, which gave them a majority of one in the Provincial Council. (67) 
A leader of the SA Party was alarmed at the llextraordinary revulsion of feeling 
exhibited during the elections". (68) It was also apparent that a large number of 
Afrikaner 'workers were turning to the Labour Party and not to the Nationalist Party, 
led by Hedzog, which had been fomed in 1913 after breaking from the SA Party. (69) 
"The four Labour members in Paxliament f o w t  the bills through each stage, 
contesting every clause. But with so few members they could not defeat the govermment 
in Parliament. Trade unions and the Labour Party organized demonstrations ayld public 
meetings to protest against the legislation being pushed throw Parliament. The huge, 
enthusiastic crowds attending these meetings were another index of the swing to Labour. 
The most repressive measure, the Peace Preservation Bill, was withdrawn on the 30th 
March. (70) The Industrial Disputes and Trades Union Bill (the two bills had been 
merged) passed throw all its stages in the House.of Assembly but failed to get 
through Senate. It reached the Senate towards the end of the session and they refused 
to consider such an important measure hastily. (71) But this was not much of a defeat 
for the government. They had quickly forced thro* the Riotous Assemblies Act, which 
contained some of the most significant penal pmvisions relating to trade unions of the 
other bills. (72) 
Abbreviations 
DC Records of the Department of Defence 
DFA Dimond Fields ~ d i e r t i s e r  
JUS Records of the De~artment of Justice. Central Arohive Pretoria  
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PM 11 l1 l1 Prime Minister 
RDM Rand Daily Mail 
SAMR Records of the South African Mounted  rifle^ 
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